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I. Introduction 
In 1983, the American Bar Association reframed the ethical 
rules for the practice of law and created the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.1 Eventually, all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia adopted their own version of the Model Rules.2 With 
few jurisdictional exceptions, ethical guidelines adopted in the 
United States restrict lawyers from sharing legal fees with 
non- lawyers.3 Additionally, the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from 
                                                                                                     
 1. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE 6 (2013–2014) (setting out a brief history of 
rules of professional conduct in the legal profession).  
 2. See id. at 7–8 (offering the scope of adoption of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
 3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(generalizing a restriction incorporated into the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct). 
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allowing a third party to “direct or regulate the lawyer’s 
professional judgment . . . .”4  
While drafting the Model Rules, the American Bar 
Association’s Commission on the Evaluation of Professional 
Standards proposed allowing non-lawyer ownership, non-lawyer 
investment, and non-lawyer management of a law firm.5 
Opponents of expanding law firm ownership to non-lawyers voiced 
immediate concern that traditional law firms would be unable to 
compete with aggressive corporate models and that economic 
pressures would erode the professional independence of lawyers.6 
Although arguments for supporting the status quo in the United 
States prevailed, other countries with common law traditions have 
since permitted alternative business structures that allow 
non-lawyer ownership and management of law firms.7 
Whether alternative business structures might improve access 
to justice for low- to moderate-income clients remains a 
contentious matter.8 Because alternative business structures are 
generally unavailable, lawyers rely on 501(c)(3) non-profit status 
and sliding-scale fee structures to reach an underserved market of 
low-to moderate-income clientele.9 Nevertheless, use of a 
sliding- scale fee structure is rare—perhaps because it fails to 
maximize law firm profits.10 A sliding-scale fee structure also does 
                                                                                                     
 4. Id. at cmt. 2. 
 5. See Tyler Cobb, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately 
Harnessing the Advantages of Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 770 
(2012) (observing an option considered by the ABA, but later rejected). 
 6. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big 
Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
10–11 (1998) (recognizing strong opposition to the expansion of law firm 
ownership to nonlawyer entities). 
 7. See Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer 
Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5 (2016) 
(suggesting that analyzing alternative paths in other countries may prove 
beneficial). 
 8. See, e.g., Bailey Cunningham, Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms: A 
Recurring Debate, 104 ILL. B.J. 48 (2016).) (“Nonlawyer ownership, aka 
‘alternative business structures’ threatens the professional independence of 
lawyers, and the ethics rules forbidding it should not be changed.”). 
 9. See, e.g., OPEN LEGAL SERV., https://openlegalservices.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2019) (demonstrating a firm utilizing both non-profit status and 
sliding- scale fee structure) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 10. See Michael Zuckerman, The Utah Lawyers Who Are Making Legal 
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not assist clients who need legal services, but do not qualify for 
LSC-funded programs and are unable to pay even a portion of 
subsidized legal fees.11 This Note addresses why using a non-profit 
model to provide legal services to low- to moderate-income clientele 
is necessarily self-limiting. This Note further suggests that 
alternative business structures permitting non-lawyer ownership 
and operation of law firms are a more effective and efficient means 
to reach a presently underserved market.  
Part II provides a background about Model Rule 5.4 and 
discusses theories and rationales for why the legal profession in 
the United States refuses to compromise on deeply entrenched 
biases against nonlawyer ownership or management of law firms. 
Part III considers the methods and structures of non-profit law 
firms currently serving low- to moderate-income clientele and 
highlights specific examples of similarities and distinctions 
between varying legal markets. Part IV offers reasons why serving 
moderate-income clientele through a non-profit model is a 
self-limiting and ultimately inadequate way of expanding access to 
justice for a presently underserved market. Finally, Part V 
advocates permitting non-lawyer ownership and management of 
law firms. By utilizing business-sector expertise and economies of 
scale, lawyers can improve access to justice for low- to 
moderate-income clientele. This Note identifies Wills as a specific 
practice area already making such a transition. 
II. Background 
A. Origin and Evolution of Model Rule 5.4 
In 1964, the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association created the Special Committee on Evaluation of 
Ethical Standards.12 The committee developed the Model Code of 
                                                                                                     
Services Affordable, ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/08/the-utah-lawyers-who-
are-making-legal-services-affordable/375717/?single_page=true (“Part of the 
reason is that it doesn’t maximize profits—you can’t get rich running it.”) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 11. See id. (illustrating how non-profit models address access to legal 
services). 
 12. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ix (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) 
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Professional Responsibility based on the ABA Canons of 
Professional Ethics.13 The ABA adopted the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility in 1969.14 By 1977, the legal profession 
recognized growing pressure to reconsider priorities inherently 
promoted by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.15 
Highly publicized lawyer conduct during the Watergate scandal 
compounded the pressure for reform by further shifting public 
sentiment toward the belief that the legal profession was openly 
self-serving.16 One specific critique of the legal profession focused 
on tasks nonlawyers could adequately perform, but were prevented 
from performing, because of a prohibition against the 
unauthorized practice of law.17  
The prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law was 
among the issues that prompted the ABA to form the Kutak 
Commission in 1977.18 The purpose of the Kutak Commission was 
“to reinforce the idea that lawyers served the public good, and 
helped improve American social, economic, and political 
structures.”19 The Kutak Commission went further than simply 
amending the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, and 
concluded “a comprehensive reformulation was required.”20 In 
                                                                                                     
(giving background on establishing the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility). 
 13. See id. (explaining how the Canons of Professional Ethics were based 
principally on the Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association 
in 1887). 
 14. See id. (stating further that the MCPR went into effect on January 1, 
1970). 
 15. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional 
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 704 (1977) (“[L]awyers' ethics are 
consistently self-serving and . . . pressure for revision of several basic concepts of 
professional responsibility is both sound and inevitable.”). 
 16. See Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the 
End of Optimism, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 699 (2016) (“By 1977, the ABA had 
worked for over a decade to show that its principal effort was service to the public, 
not mere self-interest.”). 
 17. See Morgan, supra note 15, at 708 (“[T]he important question is not 
whether lawyers have something to contribute, but, rather, what justification 
there is for wholly excluding the alternative services which could be provided 
by nonlawyers.”). 
 18. See Ariens, supra note 16, at 702–03 (listing the basic precepts of the 
Kutak Commission). 
 19. Id. at 699. 
 20. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, ABA 
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spite of recognizing the need to evolve, the legal profession reacted 
negatively toward change.21 As part of this reaction, the ABA 
ultimately rejected a proposal to allow non-lawyer ownership of 
law firms, and non-lawyer business partnerships with lawyers.22  
A rule against fee-sharing and partnerships between lawyers 
and non-lawyers was originally incorporated into the Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility on the premise of preserving the 
professional independence of lawyers.23 The Kutak Commission 
recognized revising such a rule would permit development of 
nontraditional forms of organizing a law practice.24 The 
Commission acknowledged contemporary rules restricting the 
unauthorized practice of law were not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to prevent an undermining of the legal profession, but 
instead focused on the particular form a law firm could take.25 
During its consideration of partnerships between lawyers and 
non-lawyers, the Commission was aware the legal profession 
needed to expand access to legal services.26 
                                                                                                     
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at *4 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 
1980) (describing the extent of the Commission’s objective in producing the 
Discussion Draft).  
 21. See Ariens, supra note 16, at 711 (addressing the ABA’s rejection of the 
Commission’s departure from “the traditional framework and substantive content 
of the Code”). 
 22. See Matthew W. Bish, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory 
Scheme the Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 669, 670 (2009) (considering an alternative to the current rule 
captured in Model Rule 5.4). 
 23. See id. at 674 (inferring the ABA intended the structure of the Model 
Rules DR 3-102 and DR 3-103 to restrict the unauthorized practice of law). 
 24. See ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (AM. 
BAR ASS’N, Report 400 to the House of Delegates 1982), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_resp
onsibility/kutak_8-82.pdf (explaining the need for expanding the means of 
making legal services more available) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 25. See id. (“The Commission believes the Rules in this area should focus on 
the actual potential for abuse in such developments rather than the particular 
form of law practice.”). 
 26. See id. (“[T]here is a demonstrable need for expansion of the means of 
making legal services more available.”). 
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B. Arguments Against Nonlawyer Ownership or 
Management `of a Law Firm 
The legal profession in the United States has long considered 
itself something more than a business.27 In 1909, the Court of 
Appeals of New York decided the case of Matter of Co-operative 
Law Co.28 In that case, a law firm organized as a corporation under 
a state Business Corporations Law.29 The firm operated until 1909 
when the legislature passed a statute criminalizing the practice of 
law by a corporation.30 During its analysis, the court stated:  
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant 
in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust 
and confidence. It cannot be delegated without consent and it 
cannot exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to 
practice law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would 
be subject to the directions of the corporation and not to the 
directions of the client . . . . The corporation would control the 
litigation, the money earned would belong to the corporation 
and the attorney would be responsible to the corporation only.31 
The court went on to conclude the law firm could never have been 
a corporation within any meaning contemplated by the Business 
Corporations Law, and therefore the business did not lawfully 
exist.32  
There are three potential arguments against allowing 
non-lawyer ownership or management of a law firm. The first is 
that non-lawyer ownership or partnership of a firm poses a risk to 
professional independence. The second argument is that 
non-lawyer ownership or management heightens the possibility for 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483 (1910) (“The 
practice of law is not a business open to all, but a personal right, limited to a few 
persons of good moral character, with special qualifications ascertained and 
certified after a long course of study . . . .”).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 481 (explaining the facts of the case as recited by the New York 
Court of Appeals).  
 31. Id. at 483–84. 
 32. See id. at 484–85 (reasoning that business ownership of a law firm was 
not meant as an objective of the legislature because “[s]uch an innovation with 
the evil results that might follow would require the use of specific language clearly 
indicating the intention”).  
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a breach of lawyer/client confidentiality. The final argument stems 
from fear and uncertainty about how the current business model 
for many law firms would be destabilized by entry into the legal 
marketplace of large, corporate business structures.  
1. Professional Independence 
A business model where a non-lawyer operates or manages a 
law firm may raise concerns about professional independence. 
Professional independence is thought of in two ways.33 First, 
professional independence may refer to independence from clients, 
whereby a lawyer pursues honesty with the client with regard to 
the client’s preferred course of conduct.34 Second—and pertinent to 
non-lawyer ownership or management of law firms—professional 
independence may refer to independence from third parties whose 
interests could compromise a lawyer’s professional duty to the 
client or the public.35  
Professional independence from third parties is theoretically 
protected by a restriction against sharing legal fees with 
non-lawyers, and a prohibition against practicing law 
in corporations or associations with non-lawyers.36 Without such a 
restriction a lawyer might assign his or her loyalty to “the one who 
holds the purse strings,” rather than to the client who has 
entrusted the lawyer with legal representation.37 The potential 
threat lies where lawyers would be paid to attain business goals, 
resulting in a strong incentive to sacrifice client interests and the 
integrity of the legal system as a whole.38 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or 
Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 607–08 (2013) (offering two distinct ways 
to look at “professional independence”). 
 34. See id. at 608–09 (distinguishing between independence from the client 
and independence from third parties). 
 35. Id. at 613. 
 36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(“The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These 
limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment.”). 
 37. See Jack F. Dunbar, Multidisciplinary Practice Translated Means “Let’s 
Kill All the Lawyers”, 79 MICH. B.J. 64, 66 (2000) (acknowledging concern that 
client interests would not be controlling over a lawyer’s personal economic 
interests). 
 38. See id. at 67 (arguing that economic power in the hands of nonlawyers 
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2. Breach of Lawyer/Client Confidentiality 
A business model where a non-lawyer operates or manages a 
law firm raises concerns about lawyer/client confidentiality. A 
lawyer is not permitted to share information about the 
representation of a client except in extremely limited 
circumstances.39 The purpose of confidentiality between a client 
and a lawyer is to enable trust within the relationship.40 Trust 
encourages a client to communicate candidly, and open 
communication is essential for a lawyer to effectuate adequate 
representation.41 
If a lawyer practices under an organization managed or owned 
by a nonlawyer, client information might become accessible to a 
non-lawyer, and thus not subject to the same legal protections of 
lawyer/client confidentiality.42 Various segments of a business 
with access to client information might even expose otherwise 
privileged client communications to discovery or public intrusion.43 
Vicarious non-lawyer access to client information presents a risk 
to the legal profession that would obligate nonlawyers to adhere to 
the same standards as lawyers with respect to conflicts of 
interest.44 A non-lawyer’s obligation to client confidences would 
become increasingly difficult to keep as a business grows across 
intersections of geography, client base, and practice areas.45  
                                                                                                     
shifts the goals of the profession into the economic realm, rather than centering 
considerations on professional ethics). 
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 40. See id. at cmt. 2 (positing that trust is “the hallmark” of the client-lawyer 
relationship).  
 41. See id. (“The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to 
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally 
damaging subject matter.”). 
 42. See J. Nick Badgerow, A Profession on the Threshold: The Bar Considers 
Multiple Discipline Practices, 69 J. KAN. B.A. 12, 15 (2000) (suggesting lawyers 
would need to warn clients that information disclosed to a nonlawyer within the 
business would probably not be confidential). 
 43. See id. at 15–16 (highlighting a potential alteration in expectations a 
client might have about client-lawyer confidentiality).  
 44. See id. at 16 (raising the additional context of conflicts of interest under 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 1.9). 
 45. See id. at 15–16 (suggesting that as client bases grow, conflicts between 
branches of the same business would become subject to confusion). 
508 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 499 (2019) 
3. Destabilization of Legal Monopoly 
A business model where a non-lawyer operates or manages a 
law firm raises concerns about the security of the monopoly 
lawyers possess over the practice of law. The Kutak Commission’s 
effort to alter Model Rule 5.4 to allow non-lawyer ownership of a 
law firm was defeated, at least in part, because of the “Fear of 
Sears.”46 The Fear of Sears was the belief that if large corporations 
could own law firms, small firms would be unable to compete in the 
legal marketplace.47 While protection of a monopoly on the legal 
services is framed as an interest in maintaining professionalism, 
the subtext of maintaining professional independence is often 
interpreted as a long-enduring interest to secure business for 
lawyers.48  
A monopoly on the practice of law might be worth maintaining 
if there was an imminent threat of harm presented by any 
non- lawyer that provided any legal services.49 To be sure, 
protecting the public from incompetent and unethical legal 
services is well within the scope of legitimate interests to the bar.50 
But mere qualification as a lawyer is logically insufficient to 
ensure the provision of adequate legal representation to clients.51 
An absolutist approach precluding all non-lawyer representation 
or business contact with the legal profession in all circumstances 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Cobb, supra note 5, at 771 (describing a basis for rejecting non-lawyer 
ownership of law firms). 
 47. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 10 (describing the grounds for 
opposing the Kutak Commission’s version of Rule 5.4). 
 48. See James W. Jones, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A “Radical” 
Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal Practice, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 1159, 1171 (2000) (giving a history of self-protectionism in the legal 
profession). 
 49. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 230 (1990) (“[T]he traditional rationale for 
unauthorized practice constraints—protection of the public from incompetent and 
unethical services—cannot support the current prohibitions. Although the risk to 
consumers should not be overlooked, it has been too often overstated.”). 
 50. See id. (acknowledging that the restriction against unauthorized practice 
has some merit). 
 51. See id. (challenging the notion that an inexperienced attorney is more 
advantageous to a client than an experienced legal technician). 
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fails to consider alternatives that might, on balance, benefit the 
public interest at no significant risk of harm to clients.52 
C. Alternative Business Structures Abroad 
1. United Kingdom 
Although arguments against non-lawyer ownership or 
management of law firms persist in the United States, other 
countries with common law traditions have approached the issue 
with more flexibility. The United Kingdom liberalized rules on the 
ownership of law firms through the Legal Services Act of 2007.53 
The Legal Services Act permits lawyers to form alternative 
business structures.54 The scope of the Act allowed alternative 
business structures to include non-lawyer ownership interest in a 
firm.55 The direct impact of the Legal Services Act on low- to 
moderate-income clientele is difficult to gauge because of other 
governmental policy choices that immediately followed the Act.56 
Subsequent data gathering shows that the segment of the legal 
market most immediately impacted by the Legal Services Act has 
been personal injury claims.57  
A notable structural model emerging from the Legal Services 
Act in the United Kingdom was Co-Operative Legal Services, 
which operated under the umbrella of the Co-Operative Group.58 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 231 (rejecting the limiting choice that comes with prohibiting 
the practice of law by all non-lawyers). 
 53. See Barron Dickinson, Non-Lawyer Ownership of Law Firms in Florida: 
Issues with Corporate Governance, 16 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 99, 117 (2017) 
(providing a global context for how professionalism and professional 
independence is evolving in other countries).  
 54. See Michele DeStafano, Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the 
Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2817 (2012) (explaining the 
scope of the Legal Services Act). 
 55. See Dickinson, supra note 53, at 117–18 (describing factors considered to 
allow nonlawyer investment in a law firm). 
 56. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 19–21 (recognizing that the impact of the 
Legal Services Act relies on extraneous economic and policy circumstances). 
 57. See id. at 21 (tempering optimism alternative business structures 
improve access to moderate-income clientele). 
 58. See id. at 26 (describing an alternative business structure aimed at 
providing services to moderate-income clientele).  
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The Co-Operative Group has existed in the United Kingdom in 
some form since 1844, and is owned by independent consumers.59 
The Co-Op model is engaged in numerous areas of commerce, 
including as a food retailer, a funeral services provider, and a 
general insurer.60 The stated objective of the Co-Operative’s 
expansion into legal services was to expand the entire market for 
legal services.61  
These new alternatives business structures, however, have 
not been without their share of trouble. For example, despite 
operating as one of the largest providers of legal services to 
moderate-income clients in the key area of family law, Co-Op Legal 
Services “has not been able to halt a massive increase in the 
number of unrepresented litigants in UK family courts . . . .”62 
Furthermore, Co-Operative Legal Services also endured 
challenges to its brand connected to management issues and 
financial problems in other sectors of its broader corporate 
structure.63 With only a few years of practice in a new form of 
non- lawyer-controlled business structure, it is perhaps too early to 
determine whether the alternative business structures permitted 
by the Legal Services Act will broaden access to the legal services 
market for low- to moderate-income clients in the United 
Kingdom.64  
                                                                                                     
 59. See Co-op History, CO-OP, https://www.co-operative.coop/about-
us/history (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (giving a brief history of the organization 
and its structure) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 60. Id.  
 61. See Liberalizing the Law: Supermarket Sweep, ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 
2013), https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21576675-cold-wind-
competition-sweeps-legal-services-market-supermarket-sweep (evaluating 
change in the legal market caused by activities of the Co-operative Group) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 62. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 27 (noting a steep increase in 
unrepresented litigants resulting from legal aid cuts that took place in 2013). 
 63. See Judith A. McMorrow, UK Alternative Business Structures for Legal 
Practice: Emerging Models and Lessons for the U.S., 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 694–
95 (2016) (describing challenges to Co-Operative Legal Services). 
 64. See id. at 694 (noting that “the ABS structure allowed the legal unit to 
weather a rough business year. Had it been a traditional law firm, without outside 
[financial] support, [Co-Op Legal Services] presumably would have closed.”). 
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2. Australia 
Australia is another common law country that legislatively 
expanded non-lawyer ownership or management of law firms.65 
The Legal Profession (Incorporated Legal Practices) Act 2000 
widely opened the door for legal service providers in New South 
Wales to register as companies with the Australian federal 
corporations agency.66 The Act evolved to include more opportunity 
for non-lawyer influence and investment in law firms across 
Australia.67  
The result of permitting unlimited non-lawyer investment in 
Australia has been different than the result of similar legislative 
choices in the United Kingdom.68 Motivation to incorporate law 
firms in Australia is possibly driven more by tax benefits than the 
goal of restructuring firms into large-scale, corporate models.69 
Additionally, law firm incorporation in Australia does not 
necessarily lead to non-lawyer ownership or management.70 
Supporters of the Act argue that investment capital drives law 
firm growth, which in turn helps large law firms attain economies 
of scale to engage in more public-oriented or pro bono 
representation.71 A prominent example of a public-oriented, 
                                                                                                     
 65. See Dickinson, supra note 53, at 121 (describing Australia’s embrace of 
alternative law firm business structures). 
 66. See Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A 
New Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) (providing background for the development 
of alternative business structures in Australia). 
 67. See id. at 688 n.41 (“The Attorneys General of all other Australian states 
have agreed to enact legislation over the next year or so to allow for the 
incorporation of legal practices.”). 
 68. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 29 (recognizing differences between 
impacts in the United Kingdom and Australia with respect to enactment of 
similar legislation). 
 69. See CHRISTINE PARKER, PEERING OVER THE ETHICAL PRECIPICE: 
INCORPORATION, LISTING, AND THE ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAW FIRMS 12 
(Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132926 (arguing that Australian law firms are 
motivated to incorporate primarily for a beneficial tax rate) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 70. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 30 (“[Incorporated legal 
practices] . . . have become quite common . . . but actual outside ownership . . . is 
still rare.”). 
 71. See Benedict Sheehy, From Law Firm to Stock Exchange Listed Law 
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not-for-profit firm in Australia is Salvos Legal, which is wholly 
owned by The Salvation Army.72 Salvos Legal operates in areas 
such as corporate, commercial, property, and intellectual 
property.73 Salvos Legal reinvests all of its profits to another 
division operated as Salvos Legal Humanitarian.74 Salvos Legal 
Humanitarian provides free legal services for indigent clients 
across Australia.75 Salvos Legal Humanitarian claims to assist 
hundreds of indigent clients each week, utilizing donations and 
pro-bono volunteers in addition to profits from Salvos Legal.76  
Opponents of the Act argue its benefits may be unrealized 
because large law firms beholden to investors will not engage in 
risky or publicly-oriented litigation unless ensured such litigation 
will return a profit or build the company brand.77 But whether 
incorporation of law firms and non-lawyer investment encourages 
a more publicly-oriented legal market or simply consolidates the 
legal market in a way that ultimately results in a corporate legal 
monopoly is unanswered.78 
                                                                                                     
Practice: An Examination of Institutional and Regulatory Reform, 20 INTL. J. 
LEGAL PROF. 3, 24 (2013) (arguing that incorporated legal practices have not 
significantly affected the administration of justice, but have contributed to 
corporate governance). 
 72. See Our Story, SALVOS LEGAL, https://www.salvoslegal.com.au/our-story/ 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (explaining the corporate structure of Salvos Legal) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 73. See id. (listing the firm’s various service areas). 
 74. See id. (“[W]e are a social enterprise law firm—all of our profits are used 
to fund Salvos Legal Humanitarian, our humanitarian arm which operates free 
legal services for people in need in NSW, Queensland[,] and Victoria.”). 
 75. See id.; Humanitarian Free Legal Service, SALVOS LEGAL, 
https://www.salvoslegal.com.au/expertise/humanitarian-free-legal-service/ (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 76. See SALVOS LEGAL, supra note 72 (“We provide free legal services to 
hundreds of clients every week across our sixteen offices.”). 
 77. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 33 (considering statements that firms with 
non-lawyer investors must meet expectations set out in market forecasts, and 
that controversial pro bono work is not oriented to such requirements).  
 78. See id. (restating arguments against reforms in Australia to expand 
non-lawyer investment in law firms). 
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D. The District of Columbia. 
To a lesser degree than seen in common law countries outside 
the United States, the District of Columbia has a more open 
posture toward non-lawyer ownership and management of law 
firms. The District of Columbia remains an outlier in the United 
States with respect to Model Rule 5.4, becoming the first 
jurisdiction to allow non-lawyers to become partners in law firms.79 
Rule 5.4 of the Rules Governing the District of Columbia Bar 
provides: 
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of 
organization in which a financial interest is held or managerial 
authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs 
professional services which assist the organization in providing 
legal services to clients, but only if: 
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose 
providing legal services to clients; 
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a 
financial interest undertake to abide by these Rules of 
Professional Conduct; 
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial 
authority in the partnership or organization undertake to be 
responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent 
as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1; 
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.80 
Perhaps the District of Columbia adopted a varied version of Rule 
5.4 because of the unique networking opportunities available 
within the political culture of the District.81 More so than in most 
U.S. cities, law firms in the District of Columbia stand to benefit 
substantially from hiring former non-lawyer government officials 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Justin Schiff, The Changing Nature of the Law Firm: Amending 
Model Rule 5.4 to Allow for Alternative Business Structures Resulting in 
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, 42 CAP. U.L. REV. 1009, 1019 (2014) (noting 
the unique allowance of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct).  
 80. D.C. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 5.4 (2017). 
 81. See Victoria S. Sahani, Reshaping Third Party Funding, 91 TUL. L. REV. 
405, 458–59 (2017) (describing the specific circumstances warranting relaxation 
of Model Rule 5.4 within the District of Columbia). 
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into their organization and then leveraging the interpersonal 
connections of those officials to generate business.82 
Although the liberalization of Model Rule 5.4 in the District of 
Columbia represents a departure from the ABA Model Code, the 
change is modest.83 Subsection (b)(1) provides that every 
partnership or organization with a non-lawyer investor must have 
as its sole purpose the provision of legal services.84 The narrow 
scope of the rule also limits the number of law firms that take 
advantage of the rule to those operating exclusively within the 
District of Columbia.85 Because the District of Colombia is the only 
jurisdiction where non-lawyer ownership is permitted, 
multi-district firms operating in D.C. cannot adopt a structure that 
could lead to rules violations in other jurisdictions.86 Unless 
further action is taken to reduce uncertainty about a firm’s ability 
to engage in fee-sharing with offices outside the District, the 
potential for experimentation with non-lawyer ownership inside 
the District will be restrained.87 
III. Current Nonprofit Structures 
A. Process for Obtaining 501(c)(3) Status 
Restrictions on business structures that integrate legal 
services with non-ownership or management may affect access to 
legal services for less privileged socio-economic groups. In 
response, some lawyers have created nonprofit organizations that 
                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 459 (explaining how unique opportunities have flourished in 
the District of Columbia under the relaxed rule).  
 83. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice 
and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery 
of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 98 n.78 
(2000) (highlighting the inherent limitations of the District of Columbia rule). 
 84. See id. (recognizing the textual boundaries of the rule). 
 85. See Cobb, supra note 5, at 783–84 (suggesting that the rule has a limited 
impact because it does not invite investment by non-lawyers into firms that 
operate outside of the District of Columbia).  
 86. See id. at 783–85 (suggesting a reason why more firms in the District of 
Columbia have not experimented with non-lawyer owners). 
 87. See id. at 785–86 (arguing that fully understanding whether non-lawyer 
ownership is beneficial or harmful to the legal profession requires additional steps 
yet to be taken). 
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attempt to offer legal services to underserved moderate- and 
low-income clientele.88 Both public interest law firms and legal aid 
organizations are eligible to qualify for nonprofit, tax-exempt 
status as charitable organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 501, I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3).89 However, public interest law firms and legal aid 
organizations are not functionally identical. A public interest law 
firm must serve a broad community interest.90 In contrast, a legal 
aid organization represents indigent clients in matters specific to 
the interests of those individual clients.91 A legal aid organization 
may charge clients for legal services and still remain qualified for 
tax-exempt status as long as fees are adjusted according to a 
client’s ability to pay, and not according to the type of service 
rendered.92 
Regardless of prospective clientele, starting a nonprofit law 
firm first requires compliance with registration rules set out by the 
state bar in the state or states where the firm intends to practice.93 
Properly registering for 501(c)(3) status comes with separate 
requirements, and ultimately creates additional hurdles for a 
nonprofit firm seeking to expand legal services to moderate-income 
clients. The process required by state of Virginia is offered below 
as an example.  
1. Process for State Incorporation for a Nonprofit Law Firm 
Some states draw a distinction between legal aid 
organizations and nonprofit law firms. In Virginia, a legal aid 
                                                                                                     
 88. See Mitch, Tipping the Scales of Justice: The Role of the Nonprofit Sliding 
Scale Law Firm in the Delivery of Legal Services, 20 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
375, 378–79 (2017) (describing a brief history of recognition by the legal profession 
that low- and moderate-income clients have difficulty accessing legal 
representation). 
 89. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). 
 90. See Mitch, supra note 88, at 380 (explaining the difference between 
public interest law firms and legal aid organizations, according to Rev. Rul. 75-74, 
1975-1 C.B. 662). 
 91. See id. at 381 (focusing on how a legal aid organization may be postured 
with respect to indigent clients of various means). 
 92. See Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B. 177 (explaining the substantial 
economic relief provided to the poor and distressed allowed by charging adjusted 
fees contingent upon client income). 
 93. See, e.g., Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Pt. 6 § 4 para. 14 (2018). 
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organization must first qualify as a tax-exempt entity under 
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.94 The primary purpose of 
a legal aid organization is to provide free legal assistance to those 
who cannot pay.95 Beyond expenses and costs, a legal aid 
organization is strictly prohibited from collecting a fee for legal 
services.96 The Legal Services Corporation of Virginia provides 
substantial grants to legal aid organizations offering direct legal 
assistance to clients who live at or near the poverty level.97 
However, a nonprofit law firm that collects any fees from low- to 
moderate-income clients is not considered a legal aid organization, 
and thus cannot receive grant support from the Legal Services 
Corporation of Virginia.  
The first step toward forming a nonprofit law firm that may 
collect fees is to confirm Virginia State Bar approval for the name 
of the firm in accordance with Virginia Rule of Professional 
Conduct 7.1.98 Upon name approval, formation of a nonprofit 
corporation in Virginia requires filing with the State Corporation 
Commission.99 Form SCC819 identifies an entity as a Virginia 
Nonstock Corporation.100 Under Section 13.1-814 of the Code of 
Virginia, a Nonstock Corporation does not have owners, and 
distributions to members are restricted by law.101  
                                                                                                     
 94. 15 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-10-10(1) (2017). 
 95. See id. (restricting nonprofit organizations from applying to be a licensed 
legal aid society if they serve a primary purpose other than provide free legal 
assistance). 
 96. See id. § 5-10-10(4). 
 97. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP. OF VA., REPORT TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE WORK OF VIRGINIA’S LEGAL AID PROGRAMS: FY 
2015-2016 2 (2016). 
 98. VA. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 7.1, cmt. 5 (2017). 
 99. See How to Form a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation: The Steps to Form a 
501(c)(3) Nonprofit Corporation in Virginia, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/forming-nonprofit-corporation-virginia-36091.html (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2019) [hereinafter How to Form a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation] 
(explaining how to form a nonprofit corporation in Virginia) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 100. See id. (linking to the state corporation commission for the location of 
form SCC819). 
 101. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-814 (2017); see COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE 
CORPORATION COMMISSION, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF A VIRGINIA NONSTOCK 
CORPORATION SCC819 2 (2014), 
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/publicforms/207/scc819.pdf (cautioning a person 
seeking to organize a for-profit business as a Virginia nonstock corporation to 
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Properly completing registration form SCC819 is not alone 
sufficient to ensure tax-exempt status according to IRS publication 
557, “Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization.”102 SCC819 
requires additional addenda, including a statement of purpose 
matching IRS requirements, statements agreeing not to 
participate in prohibited political activities, and a plan for 
dissolution of assets.103 
Once on file with the State Corporation Commission, a lawyer 
attempting to practice law as a nonprofit entity must file for 
registration with the Virginia State Bar.104 The Virginia State Bar 
permits a law firm to be registered as a professional law 
corporation, a professional limited liability company, or a 
registered limited liability partnership.105  
In Virginia, corporations not organized for profit are exempt 
from paying income tax under the laws of the United States.106 If 
501(c)(3) status is granted by the IRS, Virginia also exempts such 
organizations from sales and use tax, although a number of 
additional qualifications apply.107 Considering the unavailability 
of funding from the Legal Services Corporation of Virginia, 
501(c)(3) status from the IRS becomes an even more crucial 
mechanism for lowering operational costs for a nonprofit law firm 
not serving as a legal aid provider. 
                                                                                                     
consult an accountant or tax professional) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 102. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, supra 
note 101, at 2. 
 103. See How to Form a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation, supra note 99 
(stating additional requirements necessary to achieve 501(c)(3) status after 
proper registration as a nonstock corporation is satisfied). 
 104. See Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Pt. 6 § 4 para. 14 (2017) 
(stating rules and regulations governing the professional conduct of the practice 
of law through professional law corporations). 
 105. See id. (listing the different governance structures that law firms may 
take). 
 106. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-401 (explaining tax exemptions for nonprofits). 
 107. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.11 (same). 
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2. Process for IRS Qualification as a Nonprofit 
In order to apply for 501(c)(3) status with the IRS in any state, 
a nonprofit law firm must complete IRS Form 1023 and include the 
firm’s articles of incorporation.108 An application must also include 
a description of all the firm’s proposed activities, bylaws, and 
financial data.109 Submission of an application for tax-exempt 
status may take place before the firm begins operation, or may be 
submitted after a period of operation not exceeding 27 months.110 
A nonprofit firm receiving 501(c)(3) status is permitted to accept 
tax-deductible donations.111 A tax-exempt firm is thereafter 
generally required to file form 990 to report donations, and must 
also meet other annual requirements set out in section 501.112  
B. Benefits of 501(c)(3) Status for Nonprofit Law Firms 
Obtaining 501(c)(3) status offers benefits to law firms 
attempting to provide legal services to low- to moderate-income 
clients. Reducing operational costs through tax exemption, 
soliciting tax deductible contributions from donors, and qualifying 
attorneys for student loan forgiveness are advantages nonprofit 
firms might leverage in order to operate a viable model. 
1. Tax Exemption 
In 2016, the federal government taxed a qualified personal 
service corporation at a flat rate of 35%.113 Law offices are personal 
service corporations if all of the corporation’s activities 
substantially involve the performance of services in the law, and 
at least 95% of the corporation’s stock, by value, is directly or 
indirectly owned by (1) employees performing services in the law, 
                                                                                                     
 108. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 46573C, 
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, PUBLICATION 557 22 (Jan. 2018). 
 109. See id. at 4. (explaining requirements for nonprofit registration) 
 110. See id. at 5.29 (same). 
 111. See id. at 21. (same). 
 112. See id. at 8 (same). 
 113. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
FORM 1120: U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN 17 (2016).  
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(2) retired employees who performed services in the law, or (3) the 
estates of such employees.114  
Regardless of nonprofit status, law firms may not need to pay 
state income tax. Once again using Virginia as an example, law 
firms generally only need to file Virginia form 502 as pass-through 
entities.115 State income tax for law firms is instead collected 
through personal state income tax.116 In Virginia, the only 
advantage lost at the state level by not being qualified as a 
501(c)(3) is with respect to sales and use tax.117 A law firm not 
qualifying as tax-exempt for federal income tax purposes is not 
eligible for exemption from state income taxes.118 A later section 
discusses the reasons federal tax-exempt status is necessary—yet, 
still insufficient—to structure a viable model for reaching low- to 
moderate-income clients. 
2. Donations 
Charitable organizations qualifying for tax-exempt status 
may receive tax-deductible donations from individual 
contributors.119 Contributions to nonqualified organizations are 
not tax-deductible.120 In 2017, contributions to charitable 
organizations in the United States rose to a new high, reaching 
approximately $390 billion—which accounted for over 2% of 
GDP.121 While only about 30% of Americans ultimately itemized 
                                                                                                     
 114. See id. at 17–18. (listing the IRS requirements for qualified personal 
service corporations). 
 115. See COMMONWEALTH OF VA., DEP’T OF TAX’N, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING 
2017 FORM 502: VIRGINIA PASS-THROUGH ENTITY RETURN OF INCOME AND RETURN 
OF NONRESIDENT WITHHOLDING TAX 2 (2017) (explaining which corporate entities 
are not required to pay Virginia state income tax). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.11(C)(1)(a) (describing exemptions for 
nonprofit organizations).  
 118. See id. (same). 
 119. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2018) (describing allowable deductions for charitable 
contributions and gifts). 
 120. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 15050A, 
Publication 526 6 (Mar. 2018) (identifying nondeductible contributions). 
 121. See Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., 
https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (summarizing studies regarding charitable giving by 
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tax deductions before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,122 the 
incentive to donate to charitable organizations was still 
substantial, especially to high-income earners.123 Securing 
501(c)(3) status allows a nonprofit law firm to attract donors 
interested in itemizing tax deductions who might otherwise find a 
different cause to support. The ability to accept donations 
enhances the credibility of a nonprofit law firm in the eyes of the 
community it serves while simultaneously opening the door to 
additional resources that would otherwise be out of reach.124  
3. Student Loan Forgiveness 
The average law school graduate borrows over $110,000 to 
finance their degree.125 As of 2014, the overall median starting 
salary for a lawyer was $63,000 per year.126 With the burden of 
paying off student debt increasing and starting salaries remaining 
largely stagnant, lawyers beginning in the profession may weigh 
                                                                                                     
Americans) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 122. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. Law No. 115-97, 131 
Stat. 2054, 2072 (2017) (raising the amount of the standard deduction and thus 
significantly decreasing the incentive to donate to 501(c)(3) entities). 
 123. See Scott Greenberg, Who Itemizes Deductions?, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 22, 
2016), https://taxfoundation.org/who-itemizes-deductions/ (summarizing data 
provided by the IRS for the 2013 tax year) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 124. See Primary Benefits of a 501(c)(3) Corporation, 
NONPROFITLEGALCENTER.COM, http://www.nonprofitlegalcenter.com/non-profit-
resources/primary-benefits-501c3-corporation/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) 
(explaining advantages of gaining 501(c)(3) status) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 125. See Staci Zaretsky, Will You Ever Be Able to Pay Off Your Law School 
Debt?, ABOVE THE L., https://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/will-you-ever-be-able-to-
pay-off-your-law-school-debt/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (discussing the ominous 
burden of student loan debt for young legal professionals) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 126. See Employment Rate for New Law School Graduates Rises by More Than 
Two Percentage Points—But Overall Number of Jobs Falls as the Size of 
Graduating Class Shrinks, NALP (July 30, 2015), https://www.nalp.org/2014_ 
selected_pr#table1 (demonstrating a relatively stable starting salary median 
since the financial crises of 2008) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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early relief of such debt as an important factor when choosing 
employment. 
In some circumstances, loan forgiveness through the Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program is available if a 
borrower fulfills certain criteria.127 The PSLF program may 
encourage lawyers to consider legal jobs that might otherwise be 
unworkable for borrowers carrying large amounts of debt. Loan 
forgiveness under the PSLF is not considered income for tax 
purposes, thereby offering potentially significant relief in exchange 
for publicly-oriented legal work.128  
One of the criteria for receiving loan forgiveness is ten years 
of full-time employment at a qualifying employer.129 Employment 
at a nonprofit that is tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code fulfills the criteria of qualifying 
employment.130 While the future of the loan forgiveness program 
is uncertain and subject to change by Congress,131 nonprofit law 
firms can currently leverage the possibility of loan forgiveness as 
a benefit to prospective employees in order to offset lower 
compensation. The ten-year duration requirement might also 
stabilize employee turnover for nonprofit law firms that would 
otherwise struggle to retain lawyers seeking higher salaries at 
traditional firms after gaining a few years of experience.  
                                                                                                     
 127. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-
service#qualifying-employment (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (explaining the 
qualifications to receive student loan forgiveness) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 128. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Questions and Answers, FED. 
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-
cancellation/public-service/questions (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (clarifying that 
the balance of forgiven loans is not taxable as income) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 129. Id. (explaining the qualifications to receive student loan forgiveness). 
 130. See FED. STUDENT AID, supra note 127 (same). 
 131. See Zack Friedman, Trump May End Student Loan Forgiveness 
Program, FORBES, (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/ 
2018/02/14/trump-student-loan-forgiveness/#23ee1685768d (examining the latest 
budget proposal from the Trump administration) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
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C. LSC-Funded Programs 
An important source of funding to nonprofit law firms seeking 
to increase legal access is the Legal Services Corporation (LSC).132 
Often, there is a state organization serving as a supplemental 
counterpart to federal LSC funding. However, funding from LSC 
grants at the federal and state levels have limited reach and 
application. Understanding the role of the LSC architecture 
provides a better grasp of the challenges to extending legal services 
to low- to moderate-income clientele.  
1. LSC Impact 
The Legal Services Corporation is an independent 501(c)(3) 
that “promotes equal access to justice and provides grants for 
high-quality civil legal assistance to low-income Americans.”133 
LSC receives appropriations from Congress, and received $385 
million in fiscal year 2016.134 In turn, LSC is a source of funding 
for legal service providers who serve clients with annual incomes 
below 125% of the federal poverty guidelines.135 Using only this 
criteria, more than sixty million Americans are eligible for services 
supported by LSC funding.136 The federal poverty threshold in 
2016 was $14,850 for an individual and $30,380 for a family of 
four.137 
                                                                                                     
 132. Who We Are, LSC, https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/who-we-are (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2019) (providing a description of “the single largest funder of civil legal 
aid for low-income Americans”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 133. Id.  
 134. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Trump Budget Eliminates Legal Services 
Corp. Funding, ABA J. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
trump_budget_eliminates_funding_for_legal_services_corp/ (explaining the 
implications of the Trump administration’s proposed budget for fiscal 2017) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 135. See LSC, supra note 132. 
 136. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL 
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017), 
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf 
[hereinafter THE JUSTICE GAP] (giving an overview of how the Legal Services 
Corporation attempts to serve low income clients). 
 137. See id. at 60. 
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LSC offers basic field grants to increase access to civil legal 
services in accordance with Title X of 42 U.S.C. § 2996.138Eligibility 
for basic field grants requires assurances that the recipient will 
adhere to the Rules of Professional Conduct, LSC Performance 
Criteria, and ABA standards.139 Basic field grants are used to 
deliver civil legal services in accordance with an approved grant 
application and cannot be used for any statutorily restricted 
purposes.140 
For example, in Virginia the LSC provided over six million 
dollars in basic field grants in 2015, funding six programs and 
supporting the close of over 20,000 cases.141 Nearly 15% of 
Virginians live at or below 125% of the federal poverty line, 
rendering about 1.2 million Virginians facially eligible for 
representation through LSC funded programs.142  
The types of services supported by LSC grants are generally 
related to family law, consumer issues, employment matters and 
housing and foreclosure cases.143 Approximately 45% of the 
Virginia cases closed in 2017 by LSC funded programs concerned 
family law, about 20% related to housing, 16% percent related to 
consumer law, and 9% related to employment and income.144 While 
LSC funding represents vital cash flow for nonprofits providing 
civil legal services to low-income clients, it is by no means 
sufficient to meet the total legal needs of even the most 
                                                                                                     
 138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2018) (setting out the general purpose and 
objectives of the Legal Services Corporation). 
 139. See 2018 Grant Terms and Conditions, LSC, https://lsc-
live.app.box.com/s/ay5a931g2ien57ll4fb0in4riduj1c7x (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) 
(setting out expectations for recipients of basic field grants) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 140. See id. (noting the restricted activities under the grant). 
 141. See Virginia State Profile, LSC, https://www.lsc.gov/grants-grantee-
resources/our-grantees/virginia-state-profile (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) 
[hereinafter Virginia State Profile] https://www.lsc.gov/grants-grantee-
resources/our-grantees/virginia-state-profile (reporting the impact of LSC 
funding in the state of Virginia) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 142. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136, at 62 (calculating the number 
of potential eligible clients to receive representation through LSC supported 
programs). 
 143. See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136. 
 144. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 141 (breaking down case closures 
and staffing in 2017). 
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disadvantaged clients.145 In 2017, LSC estimated more than half of 
legal issues submitted to LSC funded programs received 
inadequate or no assistance because of a lack of resources.146 
2. LSC Restrictions 
Even if available resources were sufficient, there are still 
many issues and needs that cannot be supported using LSC funds. 
LSC funding may not generally be used in support of a 
fee-generating case.147 The purpose of this restriction is to keep 
limited public legal resources from being used where other private 
legal representation is accessible.148 Although LSC funds are 
available under limited circumstances for fee-generating cases, 
exceptions are not easily qualified.149  
Categorically, accepting LSC funds may also restrict attorneys 
not only from using LSC funds to represent certain clients on 
certain claims, but also restrict attorneys from using private funds 
or other public funds to represent clients or participate in various 
activities.150 Such categories include representing prisoners in civil 
litigation, participating in any class action lawsuit, abortion 
litigation, and representing non-U.S. citizens unless specifically 
permitted to do so by statutory exception.151 Other categories are 
less restrictive and may allow an attorney to participate in certain 
activities so long as LSC funding or private funding is not 
                                                                                                     
 145. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136, at 13 (recognizing that many 
legal needs remain unmet by programs supported in-part through LSC funding). 
 146. Id. at 8. 
 147. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (2018) (identifying a limitation on grants and 
contracts in connection with legal assistance to eligible clients). 
 148. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.1 (2017) (“This part is designed . . . [t]o ensure that 
recipients do not use scarce legal services resources when private attorneys are 
available to provide effective representation . . . .”). 
 149. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3 (2017) (setting out how fee-generating cases must 
have been rejected by the local lawyer referral service, or by two private attorneys; 
or that neither the referral service nor two private attorneys will consider the case 
without payment of a consultation fee).  
 150. See LSC, supra note 139 (explaining the limitations on attorneys who 
accept LSC funding). 
 151. See id. (listing, though not comprehensively, the restrictions dictating 
how LSC funding can be used). 
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appropriated for a particular purpose.152 For example, attorneys 
receiving LSC funding may participate in public school 
desegregation proceedings, but only by using other publicly 
designated funds, and not private funds or LSC funds.153 Finally, 
lawyer engagement is sometimes permitted, but with a restriction 
on using LSC funds.154 For example, an attorney wishing to 
represent a client in an action against the LSC may do so as long 
as he or she does not use LSC funding.155 The attorney may use 
other private funding or other public funding.156 
3. State LSC Funding 
As noted above, LSC funding provided by Congress only makes 
up between 27% and 55% of funding for individual LSC supported 
programs in Virginia.157 State governments sometimes fund LSC 
programs through a similar state structure, seen in states such as 
New Jersey, Delaware, Nevada, Utah, and Virginia.158  
The Legal Services Corporation of Virginia (LSCV) provides 
civil legal services to Virginia’s low-income residents through 
funding from the Virginia General Assembly.159 In 2015–2016, 
                                                                                                     
 152. See id. (recognizing a distinction between the most limiting restrictions, 
and restrictions that permit greater attorney autonomy). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. (identifying categories wherein only LSC funding is restricted 
from use). 
 157. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 136.  
 158. See NEV. LEGAL SERVS. INC., https://nlslaw.net (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) 
(demonstrating a state structure designed to provide additional support to LSC 
funding) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); LEGAL SERVS. N.J., https://www.lsnj.org/LegalServicesOffices.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice); LEGAL SERVS. CORP. DEL., INC., https://www.lscd.com 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice); UTAH LEGAL SERVS., 
https://www.utahlegalservices.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2018) (same) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 159. See REPORT TO THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE 
WORK OF VIRGINIA’S LEGAL AID PROGRAMS; FY 2015–2016, LEGAL SERVICES CORP. 
OF VA., ii (2016) https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5632a199e4b 
0292ace726ae4/t/587e4d80cd0f68450bf9b7b1/1484672409265/LSCV+FY15-16+ 
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nearly eleven million dollars were distributed to legal aid 
programs across Virginia.160 State funding from the LSCV made 
up over 50% of funding received by programs also receiving federal 
LSC support.161 Meanwhile, LSC funding only accounted for 32% 
percent of funding received by programs in Virginia receiving LSC 
support.162  
Without both LSCV and LSC funding, legal aid services would 
not be able to provide anywhere close to the current level of 
services presently available. But because funding from the state 
and federal levels combined still fails to meet the needs of even the 
most economically disadvantaged clientele, funding for 
underserved moderate-income clientele is unlikely to be considered 
through LSC sources at any time in the near future. 
D. Sliding-Scale Non-LSC Funded Law Firms. 
As noted above, LSC funding is facially inadequate to meet 
civil litigation demands for persons living below 125% of the 
federal poverty line. Additionally, extensive limitations are placed 
on representation of such persons even where funding is available. 
Thus, law firms have experimented with alternative ways to 
deliver services to those clients struggling to find access to justice. 
Earning income falling below 125% of the Federal Poverty line 
reflects grim circumstances. In 2017, a family of four could have 
earned no more than $30,750 to qualify for legal services supported 
by federal LSC funding.163 Meanwhile, the same family of four 
could have earned up to $33,948 and qualified for full Medicaid 
                                                                                                     
Overview_ Revised+1-13-2017_1pm.pdf (explaining the source and purpose of state 
money used to fund civil legal services in Virginia) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 141 (breaking down the distribution 
of LSC funding against other sources). 
 162. Id. 
 163. U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Used to Determine Financial Eligibility 
for Certain Federal Programs: Annual 2017 Federal Poverty Guidelines for the 48 
Contiguous States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY FOR PLAN. AND EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
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coverage.164 In other words, a sick patient in a family of four could 
be fully covered by Medicaid, but fail to qualify for the opportunity 
to receive legal support from an LSC funded program if a HIPPA 
violation occurred during medical treatment. 
1. Targeted Population for Sliding-Scale Law Firms. 
While access to legal representation for Americans living 
below 125% of the Federal Poverty Level is limited, about 60% of 
Americans live at or below 400% of the Federal Poverty Level.165 
The incomes for households between 125% and 400% of the Federal 
Poverty Level ranged from $30,751 to $98,400 in 2017.166 Nonprofit 
firms accepting fees from clients, or representing clients for this 
income range, may entirely lose access to both federal and state 
LSC funding.167 But some firms nevertheless choose to operate as 
a nonprofit in hope of serving clients within this income range.168  
As noted above, a law firm may qualify for tax-exempt status 
as a legal aid organization only if it collects fees based on a client’s 
ability to pay, rather than by the services rendered.169 Because 
legal aid organizations receiving LSC funding must generally 
provide services without charging a fee, and must not provide 
services to persons earning more than 125% of the federal poverty 
threshold, the effective policy conclusion might be that persons 
below the federal poverty threshold do not possess any ability to 
pay for any services rendered. So far, the IRS has not prohibited 
                                                                                                     
 164. HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ (last visited Jan. 12, 
2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 165. See Distribution of the Total Population by Federal Poverty Level (Above 
and Below 400% FPL), THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/population-up-to-400-fpl/?currentTime 
frame=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%
22%7D (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (aggregating data and creating estimates for 
Census-defined family units in 2016) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 166. Id. 
 167. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LSC RESTRICTIONS AND OTHER FUNDING 
SOURCES 1 (2018) https://lsc-live.app.box.com/s/whds6u09dcvquut3c5t40 f48hzpjlj8y 
(“No representation in f 
available or the case meets one of the exceptions stated in 45 C.F.R. Part 1609”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92.  
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nonprofit law firms from charging fees, even to the most indigent 
clients.170 What the IRS does prohibit is for a non-profit firm to 
charge a market rate for services to clients who can pay for legal 
representation, while the firm also applies a sliding scale fee 
structure to clients who cannot afford to pay for legal services at 
the market rate.171 In short, a nonprofit, tax-exempt law firm may 
create a fee structure that charges fees and extends support to 
persons earning above or below 125% of the federal poverty 
guideline up until such client could afford legal services at the 
market rate.172 But market rate services may not be rendered in 
order to subsidize services provided to persons without the ability 
to pay.173 No client of a nonprofit law firm may be charged the full 
market rate for legal services.174 
2. Examples of Sliding Scale Law Firms. 
The concept of a sliding-scale law firm is long-established. 
Since 1967, SWLA Law Center in Louisiana has operated as a 
private, not-for-profit law firm supported through a combination of 
donations and client fees.175 The stated goal of the SWLA Law 
                                                                                                     
 170. See id. (suggesting that a tax-exempt firm may charge fees to even the 
most indigent clients because “[t]he fees charged do not negate . . . from the 
substantial economic relief provided to the poor and distressed by the 
organization.”). 
 171. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b) (explaining that an organization cannot 
carry on activities broader than the purpose specified for which its tax exempt 
status was granted); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b) (2017) (same).  
 172. See AM. BAR ASS’N, Alternate Fee Arrangements, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/initiatives_awards/
alternative_fees/ (last visited May 5, 2019) (“Sliding-scale fees are based on a 
client’s ability to pay, often determined by income and family size, derived from 
the Federal Poverty Guidelines.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 173. See Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92 (“The fees charged do not negate or 
significantly detract from the substantial economic relief provided to the poor and 
distressed by the organization.”). 
 174. See Non-Profit Law Firms and Co-Pay Clinics: An Option for Affordable 
Legal Services, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/delivery_legal_services /ls_del_smith_client-centric_slides.pdf 
(“Look to what private attorneys are charging in the area and reduce cost from 
there (for example, 1/3 to 1/4 of market price.”) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 175. See Frequently Asked Questions, SWLA LAW CTR., http://swla-law-
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Center is to “serve those whose household incomes are too low to 
be able to afford a private attorney, but are too high to qualify for 
Legal Aid.”176 As a matter of scope, SWLA Law Center handles only 
civil matters in non-fee generating cases, focusing primarily on 
family law, property rights, and wills.177 With the support of 
donations, SWLA Law Center claims to gather more than half of 
its funding from the reduced fees charged directly to clients.178 
Open Legal Services of Salt Lake City, Utah represents a 
slightly different conceptualization of the sliding-scale law firm.179 
Because Open Legal Services is registered as a 501(c)(3), it may 
not seek fees from any of its clients at the standard market rate, 
but instead must charge clients based on their ability to pay.180 
Open Legal Services offers transparency about its fees.181 At the 
low-end, Open Legal Services charges $75 per hour to clients at or 
below 125% of the Federal Poverty Level.182 The fee jumps to $115 
per hour for clients making between 200% and 250% of the Federal 
Poverty Level.183 Finally, clients making between 250% and 300% 
of the Federal Poverty Level pay an hourly rate of $145.184 While 
                                                                                                     
center.com/faq.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining how SWLA operates 
and which clientele are served) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Practice, SWLA L. CTR., http://swla-L-center.com/practice.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (defining the scope of representation offered by SWLA Law 
Center) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice).  
 178. See Home, SWLA L. CTR., http://swla-law-center.com/index-2.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2018) (purporting to operate with more than 50% of operational 
costs covered by client fees, and the remainder generated from donations from 
community partners and sources such as United Way) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 179. See Zuckerman, supra note 10, (describing a sliding scale model that 
attempts to specifically reach moderate-income clients). 
 180. See Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92 (“The fees charged by the 
organization are not based upon the type of service rendered, but are based upon 
the indigents' abilities to pay.”). 
 181. See Do I Qualify, OPEN LEGAL SERVS., https://openlegalservices.org/do-i-
qualify/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining the sliding-scale model used by 
Open Legal Services) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice).  
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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Open Legal Services only presents its fees as a general estimate 
for potential clients, it also notes a ten-hour retainer fee is usually 
required up front, resulting in a minimum base representation 
amount of $750.185  
Comparing SWLA Law Center and Open Legal Services, there 
are two notable differences. The first is Open Legal Services takes 
not only civil cases, but also criminal cases.186 The second, and 
perhaps more significant, is Open Legal Services is structured with 
the objective to meet all of its operational needs from client fees.187 
A review of Open Legal Services’ financial reporting documents 
shows significant growth in revenue from services provided, 
amounting to $424,208 in 2016.188 However, in both 2015 and 2016, 
revenue from program services was below total expenses for the 
firm, and each year the difference was balanced by donations.189 
Donations to Open Legal Services rose from $9,641 in 2015 to 
$49,690 in 2016, but the entire increase in revenue from donations 
was translated into firm salaries rather than into fixed assets.190  
Part IV. Nonprofit Law Firms are Incapable of Filling the Justice 
Gap. 
LSC-funded law firms are already incapable of meeting 
demands for clients earning below 125% of the federal poverty 
                                                                                                     
 185. Id. 
 186. See Criminal Law, OPEN LEGAL SERV., https://openlegal 
services.org/criminal-law/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (providing a list of criminal 
matters that Open Legal Services might handle) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 187. See Donate, OPEN LEGAL SERV., https://openlegalservices.org/about/ 
donate/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Our business is structured so that we can 
meet all of our operational needs from client fees.”) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 188. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990, OPEN 
LEGAL SERV. 2016, https://openlegalservices.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/12/2016-990-Scanned.pdf (showing a year-over-year increase of revenue 
from $378,155 in 2015) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 189. See id. (recognizing that in both 2015 and 2016, total expenses for the 
firm were not covered by program service revenue and fell short by $21,663 in 
2016). 
 190. Id. 
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line.191 Non-LSC-funded non-profit law firms do not appear 
structurally capable of meeting the legal demands of all low- to 
moderate-income clients. And even under optimal conditions, the 
ability of a non-profit, sliding-scale law firm to grow and thrive is 
stifled by Model Rule 5.4 and IRS restrictions.192 Two factors that 
help defeat a sliding-scale model geared toward moderate-income 
clients are: (1) operational flaws associated with non-profit 
management,193 and (2) the inability of nonprofit firms to hire and 
retain skilled lawyers pressured into seeking high-earnings by 
oppressive law school debt.194 
A. Non-Profit Law Firm Management. 
1. Lawyers are Poorly-Equipped to Grow Nonprofit Firms. 
Lawyers do not receive the training necessary to develop and 
grow non-profit firms effectively. As noted above, operating a 
non-profit law firm requires adherence to IRS restrictions not 
applicable to most law firms.195 Law practice management has 
slowly evolved over the last twenty years in recognition of the 
numerous skills required for lawyers to be professionally 
successful.196 Scholarship around the subject of law practice 
                                                                                                     
 191. The Justice Gap, supra note 136 at 8 (stating that an estimated 1.1 
million eligible legal problems were projected to go unmet by an LSC-funded legal 
aid organization in 2017).  
 192. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) 
(limiting how attorneys share fees); see also Rev. Rul. 78-428, supra note 92 
(explaining how a firm must set specific fees to remain tax exempt).  
 193. See Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An 
Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 
62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1082 (2013) (“It has been a flaw in nonprofit directors' 
thinking that profit should not be central to a nonprofit's operations, and that 
flaw is furthered if not founded in the IRS's commerciality doctrine and 
substantial purpose tests.”).  
 194. See Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 451, 454 (1991) (stating that law schools should cancel law school 
debt “because of increased educational debt, there is a shortage of qualified 
lawyers willing to work for poverty law organizations, nonprofit advocacy groups, 
and the government”).  
 195. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 108. 
 196. See Gary A. Munneke, Managing a Law Practice: What You Need to 
Learn in Law School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2010) (recognizing increasing 
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management addresses human resources, fees and billing, 
compensation, marketing, and trends within the profession.197 But 
nonprofit law firms, from the outset, do not resemble for-profit law 
firms.  
Nonprofit law firms must have a board of directors, and a 
board of directors may retain authority to direct the plans and 
policies of an organization.198 For example, Open Legal Services 
lists ten board members as directly involved with the oversight of 
the organization.199 Although the board of directors at a nonprofit 
law firm may not directly control the professional judgment of a 
lawyer at the firm, the board may determine lawyer compensation, 
rental space for the firm, and other major aspects of organizational 
heading.200 If not carefully structured, election to, and decisions by, 
a board of directors can become highly politicized.201 This dynamic 
is one with which many young or inexperienced lawyers are 
naturally unfamiliar. 
In addition, nonprofit law firms must comply with reporting 
requirements that are not relevant to for-profit firms.202 These 
requirements may prompt the generation of governing 
mechanisms such as employee review processes, strategies for 
avoiding conflicts of interests, supervision of solicitation for 
donations, and training in areas such as maintaining donor 
privacy.203 
What is readily apparent is that a basic understanding of law 
firm operations leaves much to be understood about the unique 
requirements of operating a nonprofit law firm. The operational 
requirements of a nonprofit law firm are an addition to, not a 
                                                                                                     
publication on articles and resources addressing how to manage law firms).  
 197. See id. at 1215–17 (listing articles related to topics of interest for 
managing law firms). 
 198. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, STARTING AND MANAGING A NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATION: A LEGAL GUIDE, 16–17 (6th ed. 2013) (explaining that the 
authority structure of a nonprofit can become muddled).  
 199. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 188 at 7 (listing board members 
for Open Legal Services). 
 200. See HOPKINS, supra note 198, at 51–52 (explaining ways that a nonprofit 
organization may be impacted by decisions through a board of directors). 
 201. See id. at 17–18 (discussing various election systems for a board of 
directors). 
 202. See id. at 95 (discussing IRS reporting requirements via Form 990). 
 203. See id. at 97–98 (listing relevant nonprofit governance principles). 
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substitution for, an already demanding professional business 
model. The complexities of managing a nonprofit structure require 
time, and necessarily detract from representing clients and 
growing the firm in a way that can reach a larger market share. In 
spite of a decades-old recognition that access to justice for 
moderate-income Americans is inadequate, relatively few firms 
have entered the market in an attempt to access moderate-income 
clients.204 The demands of the model may simply be too daunting. 
2. Fundraising Efforts Face Difficult Marketing Challenges. 
Nonprofit law firms are required to charge below-market rates 
for legal services, making fundraising an essential element for 
meeting overhead expenses.205 Marketing fundraising efforts 
cannot reasonably hope to be both successful and passive. 
Successful marketing of fundraising efforts are more effective if 
customers can spread the word about personal experiences with a 
developed brand, as well as promote social proof to encourage 
donations.206 Open Legal Services, for example, has employed a 
number of marketing strategies by building their brand through 
storytelling, promoting the unique value of the firm, and 
highlighting media features such as articles published in The 
Atlantic.207 Yet in spite of economic growth and increase in 
charitable donations by individuals, donations to Open Legal 
Services have been flat.208 In 2014, contributions and grants 
                                                                                                     
 204. See Karen A. Lash, et. al., Equal Access to Civil Justice: Pursuing 
Solutions Beyond the Legal Profession, 17 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 489, 492 (1998) 
(recognizing twenty years ago that moderate-income Californians had little or no 
equal access to civil justice).  
 205. See supra note 171 (explaining nonprofits may not provide services at 
market rates). 
 206. See Nine Valuable Marketing Lessons from a Nonprofit—
Charitywater.org, KISSMETRICS BLOG, https://blog.kissmetrics.com/marketing-
lessons-from-charitywater/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (describing the successful 
marketing techniques of a major nonprofit) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 207. See Open Legal Services in the News, OPEN LEGAL SERVS., 
https://openlegalservices.org/about/in-the-news/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) 
(listing stories featuring the firm or members of the firm with access links) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 208. See Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 
https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ 
534 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 499 (2019) 
represented 18% of total revenue, while in 2016, contributions and 
grants represented 11% of total revenue.209 While at first glance, 
this allocation of revenue stream away from contributions and 
grants may suggest improved self-reliance, it more pointedly raises 
the question of how a firm that cannot charge market rates for 
legal services can increase caseload without increasing the deficit 
created by charging below-market rates. The numbers suggest the 
answer has been for the firm to dramatically raise its hourly rates. 
In the three years since the publication of a widely circulated 
article in The Atlantic, Open Legal Services has raised its rates for 
its lowest-earning clients by 50%.210 
This is not to criticize Open Legal Services for adjusting its fee 
structure to meet the demands of its business model. This is merely 
to illustrate that a reduced ratio of contributions and grants 
requires an increase in hourly fees to compensate for a larger 
caseload. Operational costs might only be reduced to a certain 
point. At which point costs are fully minimized, the addition of a 
case at less than the market rate can only be balanced by 
donations. 
Marketing for the purpose of obtaining donations must deal 
with the attractiveness of an individual’s donation from the donor’s 
perspective. There are over 1.5 million tax-exempt organizations 
in the United States.211 Law firms attempting to solicit donations 
                                                                                                     
(last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (showing that Americans gave $410.02 billion in 2017, 
representing a 5.2% increase from 2016); see also U.S. Economy at a Glance: 
Perspective from the BEA Accounts, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/glance.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) 
(reporting that personal income growth, while anemic, is increasing) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Nonprofit 
Disclosure Documents, OPEN LEGAL SERVS., 
https://openlegalservices.org/nonprofit-disclosures/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2019) 
(giving access to reporting that shows, with a $40,000 anomaly in 2016, effectively 
no growth in donations for the periods reported) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 209. See OPEN LEGAL SERVS., supra note 207 (demonstrating a decrease in 
percentage of contributions and grants that represented total revenue).  
 210. See Zuckerman, supra note 10 (noting that the anecdotal case selected 
for the article demonstrated a legal fee of $40 per hour, while the current 
minimum fee at Open Legal Services is $75 per hour, with a ten hour minimum 
retainer). 
 211. See Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATS., 
http://nccs.urban.org/data-statistics/quick-facts-about-nonprofits (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2019) (breaking down basic public charity statistics through 2016) (on 
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on behalf of moderate-income clients face substantial competition 
from organizations with arguably more compelling narratives. 
Additionally, seventy-percent of Americans consider themselves 
middle class, meaning donations in support of legal services for 
“moderate income” clients would be an exercise in cognitive 
dissonance for all but the highest-earning Americans (so long as 
these Americans also recognize they are high-earning).212 
Convincing “middle class” Americans to support a nonprofit legal 
firm that does not provide free services to “lower class” Americans 
may not be a plausible sell. High-earning Americans may also find 
the cause less gratifying than supporting LSC-funded legal aid 
organizations supporting the lowest-earning Americans. The 
urgency to support legal services for low- to moderate-income 
clients is therefore minimized compared to the need to support 
legal services for desperately poor clientele. 
B. Non-Profit Law Firms Cannot Hire and Retain Skilled 
Lawyers. 
One of the most important business strategies necessary to a 
successful law firm is the recruitment and retention of skilled 
lawyers. Law firms are better positioned to hire and retain skilled 
talent when recognizing the expectations and concerns of lawyers 
entering the workforce.213 While flexibility of hours and styles of 
leadership are important factors to young lawyers, economic 
realities discourage young lawyers from making long-term 
commitments to non-profit law firms, especially where the lawyers 
themselves would be qualified for discount services. Again, using 
Open Legal Services as an example, in 2016 the president of the 
                                                                                                     
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 212. See Emmie Martin, 70% of Americans Consider Themselves Middle 
Class—But Only 50% Are, CNBC (Jun. 30, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/30/70-percent-of-americans-consider-themselves-
middle-class-but-only-50-percent-are.html (describing the long-observed 
difference between middle-class status and the perception of middle-class status) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 213. See Cheryl Cran, The Future of Work in the Legal Profession: What Firm 
Leaders Need to Know About Working with Their Young Talent, 43 No. 6 L. PRAC. 
38 (2017) (explaining the shift in expectations young lawyers have for their first 
jobs as well as their careers). 
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firm earned $48,500.214 But a single mother earning this amount 
would qualify for representation by Open Legal Services.215 
For law students who borrow, the average graduate faces over 
$110,000 in debt.216 Unlike most debt, student loan debt is not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.217 The current interest rate for an 
unsubsidized Federal Stafford Loan is 6%.218 Therefore, for 
$110,000 of loan debt accruing 6% interest, a borrower must pay 
$1,221 each month for ten years in order to expunge the debt.219 In 
2015, “the median private sector salary was $68,300 and the 
median public sector salary was $52,000.”220 Both of these salaries 
fall into the 22% taxable income bracket for 2018.221 
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Prospects, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-
graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2017-03-15/us-news-data-law-school-
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Taking the facts above, suppose a lawyer in the private sector 
earned $68,300 in 2018 and carried $110,000 in law school debt at 
6% interest. He or she would actually bring home only $4,439 per 
month after taxes, less $1,221 for law school debt payment. The 
lawyer’s actual living expenses would therefore need to be satisfied 
by $3,218. Expecting a reasonable rent rate for a one-bedroom 
apartment in a mid to major U.S. city to be about $1,200 per 
month, the lawyer would retain only about $2,000 for all 
remaining expenses, or about $500 per week.222 Meanwhile, a 
lawyer working in the public sector earning $52,000 under the 
same analysis, would bring home only $239 per week. The lawyer 
would have to maintain this lifestyle for ten years in order to clear 
$110,000 of law school debt. That is to say, the pressure on a young 
lawyer to earn more money as quickly as possible is significant. 
For a financially strained firm, lawyer turnover merely adds 
additional expenses that must be absorbed by limited resources. 
But in current market conditions, training and integrating 
replacement attorneys is unlikely to provide long-term returns. 
Because growth of a non-profit, non-LSC funded law firm is 
curtailed by economic structural limitations and employment 
realities, starting firms of this kind remains an unattractive option 
for most law school graduates or mid-career professionals. For 
firms already attempting to reach an underserved market of low- to 
moderate-income clients, the economies of scale necessary to lower 
costs of providing services cannot be achieved easily, if at all. The 
larger a non-profit, non-LSC funded firm becomes, the more capital 
it must raise through grants and contributions. Because grants 
and contributions are not likely to be easily accessed by firms 
serving moderate-income clients, the firm necessarily outgrows its 
own ability to expand. Little choice remains but for the firm to 
raise hourly rates, thus virtually pricing out the clientele it was 
intended to serve. 
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V. Potential Benefits of Relaxing Model Rule 5.4 
The idea that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 could be 
relaxed to broaden access to legal services is nothing new.223 Yet in 
spite of continued lawyer underemployment,224 as well as broad 
recognition that moderate-income earners do not seek legal 
counsel to meet their needs,225 there has been no substantive 
change in Model Rule 5.4 since the Kutak Commission. The 
percentage of people with moderate means who seek legal advice 
is only about half.226 The legal needs of low- to moderate-income 
persons arguably do not require the special attention of a lawyer. 
But an argument resting on this premise is deeply cynical.227 
Low- to moderate-income persons who are nonlawyers do not know 
without consulting a lawyer which legal issues require a lawyer’s 
attention and which issues do not.228  
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Moderate-Income People, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 504–05 (2017) 
(presenting the low rate of engagement between moderate-income persons and 
legal professionals).  
 227. See AM. BAR ASS’N. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERV., supra note 
225, at 14 (“[T]he study did not delve into the severity of the legal problems people 
confront and left open the question of how many would benefit from formal 
assistance (including from a lawyer.”). 
 228. See id. (“When asked why they do not seek out a lawyer, most individuals 
reply that they ‘do not think of their justice problems as legal’ and do not recognize 
their problems as having legal solutions.”). 
EXTRA LAW PRICES 539 
Rethinking Model Rule 5.4 is productive because it permits 
business structures whereby a firm interested in providing 
services to an underserved market at discounted rates may provide 
services at full price in order to subsidize a corporate mission.229 
The mission need not require 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.230 
Rethinking Model Rule 5.4 is also productive because it allows 
nonlawyer corporations to provide services in areas where low- to 
moderate-income persons can easily identify their own needs.231 
There are a number of practice areas where a corporation might 
develop mechanisms to reduce costs of legal counsel, including 
family law, housing issues, immigration, and access to healthcare 
and public benefits—to name a few.232 Rather than attempt 
exploration of all possible impacts to all applicable practice areas, 
the potential impact on the practice area of wills and estates 
planning is considered below.233 
A. Need for Estate Planning 
According to a Gallup poll taken May 4–8, 2016, only about 
44% of Americans “have a will that describes how they would like 
their money to be handled after their death.”234 The percentage of 
Americans with a will and part of a household earning between 
$30,000 and $75,000 per year decreased by ten percent between 
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2005 and 2016, falling to 38%.235 The same year, 31% of all 
American households represented this income earning range.236 
Likewise, the percentage of Americans with a will and part of a 
household earning less than $30,000 fell to 31%,237 while 44% of 
Americans represented households in this income earning 
range.238 In short, about 75% of American households earn less 
than $75,000 per year, and more than six out of ten Americans 
living in these households do not have a will.239  
As the American population ages over the next several 
decades, wealth transfer will occur at levels not previously 
observed.240 While it is true individuals should make wills to 
ensure guardianship of children, protection of a business, control 
of the disposition of assets, or allaying stress of loved ones, there 
are also broader implications.241 Intestacy is likely to result in high 
transaction costs and inefficient allocation of resources, especially 
when the decedent requires substantial care prior to death.242 
Intestacy disproportionately affects descendants of middle or 
lower-class economic status.243 Fear of death may discourage 
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people of all income levels from making a formal will, but 
inaccessibility to an expensive and complex will-making process is 
also a deterrent.244 Something can and should be done to address 
this problem. 
Access to prepared documents has improved over the last 
twenty years through document assembly software.245 Perhaps the 
most recognizable brand in the area of legal documents 
preparation is LegalZoom.246 LegalZoom offers customers 
document preparation support to construct a last will, living trust, 
living will, and power of attorney.247 For additional cost, customers 
may purchase access to an independently-contracted lawyer who 
reviews prepared documents, although customers are not required 
to purchase this access.248 Depending on answers to preselected 
questions,249 the range of cost to the customer may fall well below 
rates charged by an attorney, depending on the geographic 
location, experience, and expertise of the attorney. 250 The potential 
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for client savings is substantial, and the service is merely a 
function of internet access and moderate expense.251 
Although internet document preparation may be an 
improvement over no access at all, developing a will is a highly 
private endeavor.252 For many, following the directions on a 
prepared form or exchanging electronic communication with a 
contracted attorney may provide an inferior experience with those 
who are able to sit down with a responsive human being and gain 
assurance that a legal document has been properly executed. 
B. Relaxing Model Rule 5.4 Allows Corporations to Begin to Fill 
the Gap 
Corporations have demonstrated an ability to fill gaps in 
access to other areas where professional expertise is also 
available.253 Teeth whitening, eye care, pharmacy services, and tax 
preparation have all been integrated into corporate models without 
significantly risking the health, safety, or security of customers in 
need of those services.254 There is little reason to believe legal 
services in areas such as wills and trusts need be held to any 
greater standard.255 Tax preparation services are considered below 
as a reasonable comparison and intersection point to increase 
access to wills preparation.256 
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In 1955 H&R Block was founded as an income tax return 
preparation company.257 Presently, H&R block has 12,000 retail 
offices worldwide.258 Employees of H&R Block must qualify in each 
state where they operate to prepare income taxes, and training by 
H&R Block meets the educational standards in each state to fulfill 
the requirements for training in tax preparation.259 H&R Block is 
not limited to the simplest tax returns, but charges for returns 
based on complexity.260 
Wills and trusts, like tax services, can be extremely 
individualized and complicated, yet delivered under a corporate 
structure that provides training, liability coverage, and economies 
of scale that permit the reduction of the price of services.261 If 
LegalZoom was permitted to hire employees to support the 
completion of the documents it provides, it too could experiment 
with a brick and mortar presence, and bundle easily commoditized 
services such as wills and trusts. Similar to Vision Centers found 
in Walmart,262 access to legal services would become visible to the 
clients who need the services, and in a format that is neither 
intimidating nor aloof. It might well be that legal services for 
low- to moderate-income clients is less a function of price than of 
product placement.263 
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VI. Conclusion 
The notion all legal services are the exclusive realm of lawyers 
and cannot be managed by nonlawyers, is asserted at the expense 
of low- to moderate-income persons.264 Model Rule 5.4 presents a 
false choice: Either sacrifice the sanctity of the legal profession or 
perpetuate a system that fails to provide access to those in need of 
legal services.265 No other general profession deals in such 
absolutist terms, nor is there any substantial reason to believe the 
legal profession will denigrate into combo meals and Presidents’ 
Day sales.266 
The way Americans consume products and services has 
fundamentally shifted.267 Experiments by sliding-scale firms to 
reach moderate-income clients are not changing, and will not 
change, the consumer landscape.268 The legal profession should 
allow corporations to tap into the large numbers of underemployed 
lawyers in order to access the segment of clients who cannot afford, 
or do not wish to seek out, traditional legal counsel.269 By 
increasing the visibility of legal services and making those services 
more approachable, low- to moderate-income clients will become 
more inclined to seek attorneys at traditional law firms when 
possible.270 The price of insecurities within the legal profession 
should not be paid in unnecessary, adverse legal outcomes for 
low- and moderate-income clientele.271 
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